ARTICLES

THE ALASKA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW: FACT-FINDING, APPELLATE REVIEW,
AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
COMPENSABILITY
ARTHUR LARSON*
AND JOHN LEwIs**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Workers' compensation systems attempt to achieve a balance between requiring significant proof of each element of a claim and permitting or even mandating the payment of benefits without substantial
evidence of causation or disability. Most systems use a combination of
statute and case law, but in the final analysis the appellate courts determine which party is burdened and whether each party has met its
obligations. Review of the validity and meaning of findings of fact
often puts the appellate court in direct conflict with the lower court or
administrative body charged with the initial responsibility for making
findings of fact and arriving at a decision. Appellate court reversals of
fact-finder decisions have a significant impact on the entire compensation system, as well as on the individual cases appealed. When courts
"interfere" routinely with factual findings made at the trial or administrative hearing level, there is a danger that the lower tribunal will
become little more than a starting place for claims. It is likely that
many litigants will appeal their cases, primarily in the hope of being
able to reargue the facts successfully. Further, the direction and scope
of the compensation system will be influenced by the appellate court's
perceptions of matters of proof and fact-finding.
This article examines the statutory presumption of compensability in Alaska's workers' compensation system. First, the judicial
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interpretation of the presumption is discussed. A section regarding
the interpretation of the presumption in New York's workers' compensation statute is included because Alaska's statute is derived from
New York's statute. The next section outlines the judicial framework
for applying Alaska's presumption. Finally, the scope of the factfinder's authority and the scope of appellate court review are analyzed.
II.

A.

INTERPRETING THE GENERAL PRESUMPTION OF
COMPENSABILITY

Construction under Alaska Law

In Alaska's workers' compensation system, all fact-finding authority is vested in the Workers' Compensation Board (the Board),
with review by the superior court and the supreme court only on questions of law and substantial evidence.' Unlike most state workers'
compensation statutes, however, Alaska's Workers' Compensation
Act contains a broad tatutory presumption of compensability which
provides that in a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation "it is presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary" that the claim comes within the provisions of the Alaska
2
Workers' Compensation Act.
The language of this section is not unique. In applying the presumption, the Alaska Supreme Court often looks for guidance to similar language establishing a presumption in the federal Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 3 In addition, there is a
wealth of New York case law interpreting New York's Workers' Compensation Law,4 from which both the federal and Alaska presumptions are derived.5 Despite the available precedent, the Alaska
Supreme Court took many years to arrive at a definitive position concerning the proper application of the presumption.
1. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044, 1046-49 (1978); Beauchamp v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970).
2. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120 (1984).
Presumptions.

(a)

In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for

compensation under this chapter it is presumed, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, that
(1)

the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter;

(2) sufficient notice of the claim has been given;
(3) the injury was not proximately caused by the intoxication of the
injured employee or proximately caused by the employee being under the
influence of drugs unless the drugs were taken as prescribed by the employee's physician;
(4) the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured
employee to injure or kill self or another.
3. 33 U.S.C. § 320 (1982) (enacted in 1927).
4. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 21 (McKinney 1965) (enacted in 1913).
5. See 4 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 89.10 (1984).
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The first mention of the statutory presumption in Alaska is found
in a 1966 decision. In Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation
Board,6 the court reviewed a denial of benefits based on the Board's
finding that the decedent's heart attack did not arise out of his employment. 7 The decision did little to explain the proper application of the
presumption. Indeed, the court stated at the outset that the question
to be decided was "whether in the light of the whole record [the
Board's] finding is supported by substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 8 The only analysis of the statutory presumption is
found in two statements by the court:
The workmen's compensation statute creates a presumption that in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary a claim for compensation comes within the provisions of the statute. Accordingly,
it is presumed that Thornton's death was work-connected in the
absence of substantial evidence that it was not. Such evidence is
absent here.
.. . The evidence shows that the exertion of climbing the
tower was a precipitating factor in Thornton's death, and this bolsters the statutory presumption that the death arose out of and in
the course of Thornton's employment. 9
The court overruled the Board's decision and held, somewhat indirectly, that there was no substantial evidence to rebut the statutory
presumption and support a denial of benefits. 10 In fact, all of the medical evidence in the case supported compensability under the rules of
causation established by the court. As a result, the court's comments
concerning the presumption simply raised questions whether any evidence, beyond the filing of a claim, was necessary to invoke the presumption and what effect "bolstering" evidence had on the
presumption's application.
The supreme court's first direct confrontation with the statutory
presumption of compensability came in Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales. I The issue arose in the context of a possible conflict between
the operation of the presumption and the holding in RCA Service Co.
v. Liggett.12 The Liggett court had held that "[t]he burden of proving
that an injury arose out of and in the course of the employment rests
upon the claimant."' 13 The Gonzales court found no inconsistency between Liggett and the statutory presumption:
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966).
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
Id.
507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).
394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964).
Id. at 677, cited in Gonzales, 507 P.2d at 503-04.
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There is no inconsistency for the presumption. . . places a burden
on the employer to go forward with evidence on the issue of
whether the injury arises outside or within the scope of employment. Once competent evidence is introduced, the presumption
drops out, and the final burden of proof as alluded to in R. CA.
Service Co. v. Liggett as to all essential elements is on the

claimant. 14

The court appeared to hold that the mere filing of a claim was sufficient "proof' to support an award, at least on the issue of compensability, unless the presumption was rebutted by substantial evidence
of noncompensability.
This interpretation was bolstered, although in a rather confusing
manner, by the court's next decision dealing with the statutory presumption, Employers Commercial Union Co. v. Libor.15 The Board in
Libor ruled for the claimant and the employer appealed. If the presumption of compensability does carry the weight of evidence and is
itself sufficient to support an award, the initial question upon review
should have been whether the employer had met its burden of presenting substantial rebuttal evidence. On appeal, the employer argued that
the Board's decision could not be upheld because it was not supported
by substantial evidence and because, since there was substantial evidence "contrary to the presumption, . . . the benefit of the presumption was not available to the claimant." 16 The court held, in the last
sentence of its decision, that the Board's decision was supportable on
the basis of the presumption alone since it had not been overcome by
substantial evidence to the contrary. 17 The court spent considerable
time, however, determining whether there was substantial evidence to
support the award, a task which should have been totally unnecessary
if the presumption were the equivalent of evidence and, as the court
finally decided, had not been rebutted.
The evidence supporting the award in Libor was not particularly
strong. In May of 1969, the claimant suffered an injury at work, re18
sulting in a fractured transverse process of the L2 and L3 vertebra.
After a two week absence, the claimant returned to work until February 1971 when he stopped work due to lower back pain. 19 In April he
underwent a laminectomy at L5-S1, affecting different vertebra than
had been initially injured at work.20 The operating physicians, who
later testified in support of the award, would not testify that there was
14. Gonzales, 507 P.2d at 504.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

536 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1975).
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 130.
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a causal connection between the original accident and the
laminectomy, other than to say that a connection could exist.2 1 The
court held 22 that this evidence, together with the claimant's testimony
and the Board's expertise and discretion in such matters, constituted
23
substantial evidence of causal connection.
24
It was not until 1976, in Commercial Union Cos. v. Smallwood
(Smallwood1) that the court directly addressed the questions whether
the claimant must introduce "foothold" evidence before the presumption of compensability takes effect and, if he must, how much evidence
is required. Smallwood I involved a claim for disability resulting from
renal failure. The Board awarded benefits, but the case was remanded
for reconsideration because of technical questions concerning the admissibility of certain medical evidence. In its decision, the court apparently retreated from the broad interpretation in Libor25 and
Gonzales26 that the presumption itself, without some kind of evidentiary support, was a sufficient "foothold" for the claimant's case:
The claim in this case is based on highly technical medical considerations pertaining to the cause of the claimant's renal failure. While
valid awards can stand in the absence of definite medical diagnosis,
this would appear to be the type of case in which it is impossible to
form a judgment on the relation of the employment to the disability
without medical analysis. 27
Smallwood returned to the Alaska Supreme Court in Burgess
Construction Co. v. Smallwood2 8 (Smallwood I1). Although the court
once again remanded the case to the Board, this time on the basis of its
determination that the Board had applied the wrong causation test in
denying benefits, 29 it reexamined its prior comments concerning the
need for medical evidence in matters involving technical questions of
causation:
We did not mean by this language to imply ... that the statutory
presumption of compensability in the absence of substantial evi-.
dence to the contrary is not applicable in cases such as this. Rather,
the quoted language simply acknowledges that before the presumption attaches, some preliminary link must be established between
the disability and the employment, and that in claims "based on
highly technical medical considerations" medical evidence is often
21. Id.
22. The court relied on its prior holding in Beauchamp v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970), cited in Libor, 536 P.2d at 130-31.
23. Libor, 536 P.2d at 131-32.
24. 550 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1976).
25. 536 P.2d at 132, discussed supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
26. 507 P.2d at 504, discussed supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
27. 550 P.2d at 1267.
28. 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).
29. Id. at 317.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:1

necessary in order to make that connection. . . . But once a prima
facie case of work relatedness is made, . . . the Board may not
ignore the
presumption and allocate the burden of proof to the
30
claimant.
This broad language means that the mere filing of a claim does not
allow the Board to presume compensability. Smallwood IH finally established that before the presumption may be invoked there must be
foothold evidence that the claimant's disability arose out of, or in the
course of, employment. The quantity and quality of the evidence required will depend on the31extent to which the question in controversy
is a "technical" question.
B.

New York Construction of the Presumption Clause Prior to
Adoption of the Alaska Statute

The Alaska presumption was taken, as noted at the outset, wordfor-word from the New York workers' compensation law, 32 or, in
what amounts to the same thing, from the federal Longshoremen's
Act, which itself copied the New York law. A standard maxim of
statutory construction is that when a state copies verbatim a provision
from a sister state's statute, and that statute already has been interpreted by the sister state's court of last resort, the copying state is
deemed to have adopted the interpretation. 33 The New York Court of
Appeals had provided an explicit and detailed interpretation of the
New York statutory presumption before Alaska adopted it. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine New York's interpretation in order
to answer two principal questions. First, what demonstration of a
"preliminary link" between the disability and employment is necessary
to give the presumption of compensability a foothold? Second, if the
employer rebuts the presumption with substantial evidence, does the
presumption "drop out," or does it continue to function as "evidence,"
strengthening the claimant's case, and does the employer still retain
the burden of persuasion?
30. Id. at 315-16.
31. Id. The Smallwood II decision was apparently overlooked only seven months
later. In Employers Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Schoen, 554 P.2d 1146 (Alaska
1976), an award was made for disability resulting from a heart attack, with the only
medical testimony stating that causation was "conceivable, but by no means certain."
Id. at 1147. That testimony, coupled with evidence of a heart attack and symptoms
occurring at work, was held to be sufficient to support the award, despite the fact that
the claimant had a history of severe heart trouble and even though questions of causation in cardiac cases would appear to be as technical as those involving renal failure.
Id. at 1147-48.
32. Supra text accompanying notes 3, 5.
33. Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 99 Utah 28, 35, 96 P.2d
722, 725 (1939).
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1. The 'foothold"problem. At first glance, the sweeping language
of the statutory presumption seems to mean that merely making a
claim, and showing that death or injury occurred, establishes a prima
facie case. The New York Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation from the very beginning. Long before the Alaska provision was
adopted, the New York Court of Appeals firmly established that some
kind of preliminary link between the injury and the employment must
be shown before the presumption could be invoked. Indeed, the
Alaska Supreme Court in Smallwood IP4 clearly accepted this view.
A moment's thought reveals that otherwise a claimant would merely
have to say: "My husband, who was one of your employees, has died,
and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative duty
would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the employment.
The leading New York case establishing the need for an initial
showing of employment connection was Lorchitsky v. Gotham Folding
Box Co.35 The claimant had been injured by either an unexplained fall
or an assault by a stranger. 36 The Board believed it was unnecessary
to determine the precise cause of the claimant's injury because of the
statutory presumption that the injury "arose out of and in the course
of the employment. ' 37 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:
It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's
Compensation Law ... that the accident arose out of and in the
course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently
held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from
which the conclusion can be drawn that
the injuries did arise out of
38
and in the course of the employment.
39
The Court of Appeals in Daus v. Gunderman & Sons, Inc.,
which involved a salesman injured at midnight, reached the same conclusion as the Lorchitsky court did. The court reversed the Board's
award and observed: "Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection appears between the
accident and the employment." 4 In Dyviniek v. Buffalo CourierExpress,4 1 the question whether the statutory presumption applied arose
when a photographer was exposed to typhoid. Again, the court
stressed that "[t]he lack of any evidence connecting the disease with
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981), discussed supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
230 N.Y. 8, 128 N.E. 899 (1920).
Id. at 12, 128 N.E. at 900.
Id.
Id. at 12, 128 N.E. at 901 (citations omitted).
283 N.Y. 459, 28 N.E.2d 914 (1940).
Id. at 466, 28 N.E.2d at 918.
296 N.Y. 361, 73 N.E.2d 552 (1947).
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accidental injury in the course of employment may not be supplied by
43
the statutory presumption. '42 McCormack v. National City Bank
involved an elevator operator's collapse while at work and his eventual
death from a cerebral hemorrhage. The court reversed an award and
commented on the use of the statutory presumption:
[A]s this court has frequently ruled, "[the presumption] cannot be
used as a substitute for actual proof." . . . Consequently, where as
in the present case, there is no evidence at all of industrial accident
or of accidental injury, the lack of such evidence, [sic] may not be
supplied by the presumption; in other words section 21 may not be
availed of, or the presumption utilized, to establish the incident of
accident itself.44
Given that the case law establishes a need for some threshold
showing of work-relatedness, the question remains: What kind of
showing will satisfy the requirement of some work-connection sufficient to give rise to the statutory presumption?
In the most common type of case, the presumption supplies the
"arising-out-of-employment" or work-connection factor if there is evidence that the injury occurred while the employee was at work. 45 In
most of these cases the injury or death is unexplained, but if the injury
or death is in the course of employment, the presumption is routinely
applied. 46 The presumption is particularly helpful in cases in which
both an idiopathic factor and an occupational factor possibly figure in
the causation of the injury. Thus, in Kurash v. FranklinStores Corp., 47
in which the employee died of a subarachnoid hemorrhage after a violent fall,4 8 the court found:
But where there seems a reasonable basis for a difference in medical
opinion on the cause of death, i.e., whether due to the violence of a
fall. . . or whether due to internal causes with a resulting violence,
there has been a tendency to sustain the presumption invoked by the
Board
where the medical record would be open to a finding either
49
way.

42. Id. at 364, 73 N.E.2d at 552.
43. 303 N.Y. 5, 99 N.E.2d 887 (1951).
44. Id. at 11, 99 N.E.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Tietjen & Steffin Milk Co., 261 N.Y. 549, 550, 185
N.E. 733, 734 (1933); see also 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, -§ 10.33 n.58 (1984) (summarizing twenty other New York cases).
46. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, §§ 10.32-.33, including unexplained suicides,
§ 10.33(c); unexplained falls, § 10.33(b); and unexplained assaults, § 10.33(d).
47. 12 A.D.2d 368, 211 N.Y.S. 838 (1961).
48. Id. at 369, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
49. Id. at 371, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 840. When the issue is medical causation, the
Alaska Supreme Court has made a valuable contribution to the list of potential "footholds" by holding that, in some cases, the foothold must take the form of the introduction of some medical evidence connecting the employment with the injury.
Smallwood II, 623 P.2d at 316, discussed supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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2. The "drop-out" issue. New York case law on the question
whether the presumption of compensability drops out after the introduction of substantial rebuttal evidence was clear and authoritative
prior to the enactment of Alaska's Workers' Compensation Act. In
Wilson v. GeneralMotors Corp.,50 the New York court denied compensation and made it clear that the presumption drops out:
[The presumption] has no bearing here, for it cannot be used as a
substitute for actual proof that the injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment .... In truth, the presumption has no
place in any case once the facts are fully developed;
of necessity, it
51
fails in the presence of contrary evidence.
This statement is substantially identical to the Alaska Supreme
Court's statement in Gonzales,52 that, "[o]nce competent evidence is
introduced, the presumption drops out, and the final53burden of proof
. . .as to all essential elements is on the claimant."
The most extreme contrary position on this point has been developed by Hawaii. In New York and Alaska, the statutory language
requires that, absent substantial rebuttal evidence, "(1) the claim
comes within the provisions of this chapter." Hawaii, like Alaska,
copied the New York formula, although in 1963 it changed the wording of its statute to: "it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary: (1) That the claim is for a covered work
injury."' 54 This change, according to the editors of the statute, was
meant to be "chiefly of a formal character. ' 55 Hawaii courts have diverged substantially from the New York and Alaska position.
In Acoustic, Insulation & Drywall, Inc. v. Labor & IndustrialRelationsAppeal Board,5 6 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that, even after the employer had presented rebuttal evidence, the "employer [has]
both the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of
persuasion. 5 7 The court reiterated this position in a per curiam opinion denying a petition for a rehearing in Acoustic5 8 and in Akamine v.
Hawaiian Packing & Crating Co.,59 DeFries v. Association of Owners,
999 Wilder,60 and Lawhead v. United Air Lines. 61 Although a few federal and other cases are cited in these opinions, none of them supports
50.
51.
52.
53.

298 N.Y. 468, 84 N.E.2d 781 (1949).
Id. at 472, 84 N.E.2d at 783.
507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973), discussed supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
Id. at 504.

54.

HAWAII REV. STAT.

55.
Board,
Senate
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

§ 386-85 (1976).

Acoustic, Insulation & Drywall, Inc. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Appeal
51 Hawaii 312, 315 n.1, 459 P.2d 541, 543 n.1 (1969) (quoting 1963 Hawaii
Journal 793).
51 Hawaii 312, 459 P.2d 541 (1969).
Id. at 316, 459 P.2d at 544.
51 Hawaii 632, 466 P.2d 439 (1970).
53 Hawaii 406, 495 P.2d 1164 (1972).
57 Hawaii 236, 555 P.2d 855 (1976).
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the extreme view that the burden of persuasion always remains on the
employer. The Hawaii court could find nothing more substantial than
the repeatedly cited statement from Wheatley v. Adler,62 that if an injury arises in the course
of employment, doubts should be resolved in
63
the claimant's favor.
The statutory presumption, however, is not needed to effect the
policy that doubts should be resolved in the claimant's favor. This
policy has been adopted by some courts in states which lack the statutory presumption." Moreover, it is possible to accept this general approach and still follow the normal rule that, once the statutory
65
presumption has been rebutted, the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
At the time Acoustic was decided, a New York decision, Wilson v.
General Motors Corp., 66 had clearly settled the matter and was available to the Hawaii court. Unlike the cases cited by the Hawaii court,
the Wilson case should have been more than persuasive authority; it
should have been binding if one accepts the rule of construction that a
state adopts a sister state's case law interpreting a statutory provision
when it enacts a similar provision. 67 Wilson had the further advantage
of being specifically on point. Nevertheless, Wilson had one serious
disadvantage for the Hawaii court: it held the opposite of what the
court wanted to hold, as evidenced by its repeated and vigorous reaffirmation of its lonely position over the years.
One may question whether the statutory presumption is of much
value to the claimant if its sole effect is to shift the burden of producing evidence to the defendant. The answer to this question may help
explain what the presumption was really intended to do.
A closer look at the fact situations in the dozens of New York
cases in which the presumption was successfully invoked reveals that
almost all of them were cases in which a crucial fact of work-connec61. 59 Hawaii 551, 584 P.2d 119 (1978).
62. 407 F.2d 307 (D.D.C. 1968).
63. Id. at 312.

64. See, e.g., Garza v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 3 Cal. 3d 312, 319,
90 Cal. Rptr. 355, 360, 475 P.2d 451, 456 (1970).
65. The Alaska Supreme Court has described its application of the policy that
resolves doubts in favor of claimants as follows:
In Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 411 P.2d 209, 211
(Alaska 1966), we noted that doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant "if there were any doubt as to what the substance of the medical testimony was.".

.

. We believe the Thornton approach is correct and the rule is

properly applicable only when the substance of a particular witness' testimony is in doubt.
Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Alaska 1978).
66. 298 N.Y. 468, 84 N.E.2d 781, discussed supra text accompanying note 50.
67. Supra text accompanying note 33.

1985]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

tion was not only unknown and unexplained, but unknowable and inexplicable. Of course this is true of all cases where the injury is
unexplained. Suppose a worker is found dead at his work station with
a head wound. There is no way of knowing how he died - whether
he fell or was assaulted, and in either case whether it was the result of
personal or work-related factors. Without the presumption of compensability, the claimant's task of carrying his burden of proof of
work-connection would be hopeless. With the presumption, the burden of proving absence of work-connection passes to the employer.
The employer's task of disproving work-connection, however, is
equally hopeless. What is unknowable to the claimant is equally unknowable to the employer. Thus, proof that the death occurred during the course of employment provides the "foothold," and the
presumption carries the day.
The employer cannot rebut the presumption merely by raising
speculative non-work-connected explanations of the injury. The leading case on this issue is Goddu's Case,68 in which the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts interpreted the state's statutory presumption,
which is similar to New York's but limited to cases of death or of
physical or mental inability to testify. 69 The court held that the presumption supported an award for death from a fall on a level stair
landing, despite the fact that there was no explanation of the cause of
the fall and there was evidence that the decedent had suffered a coronary attack two years earlier. The court found that the "contrary"
evidence was not sufficiently "substantial;" it would be speculative to
on nothing
assume that the present fall was caused by a heart attack
70
more than evidence of a heart attack two years earlier.
The original draftsmen of the New York statute may have been
concerned mainly with the unexplained-death and unwitnessedaccident problems. Judge Conway's dissent in McCormack71 lent support to this view when he wrote:
The presumption in section 21 has been prescribed by our Legislature by reason of the difficulty in establishing the cause of death in
the person injured dies as a result of an
cases, among others, where
72
unwitnessed occurrence.
Nonetheless, the drafters of the New York statute failed to limit the
presumption to these types of cases, as Massachusetts and some other
states have done.
Other basic questions about the applicability of the presumption
in Alaska remain unanswered by either the case law or the statute.
68. 323 Mass. 397, 82 N.E.2d 232 (1948).
69. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 7A (Law. Co-op. 1976).
70. 323 Mass. at 400-02, 82 N.E.2d at 234-35.
71. McCormack v. National City Bank, 303 N.Y. 5, 99 N.E.2d 887 (1951) (Conway, J., dissenting), discussed supra text accompanying note 43.
72. Id. at 16, 99 N.E.2d at 892 (Conway, J., dissenting).
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For example, the significance of the presumption's wording, that "in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . the claim
comes within the provisions of this chapter, ' 73 is not clear. The language could be construed to apply only to issues of compensability of
initial claims, rather than to questions such as duration and extent of
disability. By implication, the Alaska Supreme Court indicated that
the statute has a broad application. In Cook v. Alaska Workmen's
CompensationBoard,74 the court stated that doubt as to what the medical testimony established should be resolved in favor of compensating
the employee. 75 The court also made reference to "the presumption in
favor of allowing claims."' 76 The authority offered by the court for
these statements, however, was weak, 77 and these issues have not yet
been confronted directly by the court.78 Because the question is of
legislative origin, legislative clarification may be helpful, if not
necessary.
III.

APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION IN ALASKA'S SYSTEM

In those situations in which the presumption of compensability
applies, it is not difficult to fit the presumption within the statutory
and court-made scheme for resolving disputes and reviewing the actions of the Workers' Compensation Board. The steps which the
Board should take in deciding a claim are outlined below.
1. The supreme court determined in Smallwood IF 9
that the mere filing of a claim does not automatically result
in the application of the presumption. Therefore, the Board
must determine whether the claimant has supplied the evidence necessary to establish a "preliminary link" between
the injury and employment. If the claimant has not established this foothold, the claim must fail.
2. Once the foothold evidentiary requirements for invoking the presumption have been met, the Board must determine whether the employer has presented substantial
73. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120(a)(1).
74. 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).
75. Id. at 32.
76. Id. at 35.
77. Id. at 32, 35. The court in Cook cited, without explanation, Thornton v.
Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966), as support for the
proposition that doubt should be resolved in favor of compensation. See discussion
supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
78. The court has applied the presumption to situations other than determinations of initial injury. A recent example is Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, No. 2904 (Jan. 25,
1985), where the court applied the presumption to a determination of which insurance
carrier was responsible for coverage of a second period of disability.
79. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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evidence to the contrary. If the employer has not, the claim
must be granted.
3. If substantial evidence to the contrary is presented
by the employer, the burden of persuasion then rests with the
employee. The employee must convince the Board of the
merit of the claim without the benefit of the presumption.
On appellate review, the questions to be resolved are similar, but
not identical.
1. If the Board decides in favor of the employer, the
decision must be affirmed if the court agrees, as a matter of
law, that there is substantial evidence to support the decision. 80 The court may not "reweigh the evidence,"' 8 1 because
that is the Board's function as fact-finder. Nonetheless, the
question whether "substantial evidence" has been presented
is a question of law. 82 Thus, the court has the discretion to
evaluate the legal sufficiency of the facts. If the court finds,
as a matter of law, that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, it can reverse or remand for
further proceedings.
2.(a) If the Board decides in favor of the claimant, the
first issue to be determined on appeal is whether the claimant
presented sufficient evidence to meet the foothold test of
work-connection. If he did not, the claim must be denied.
(b) If the claimant presented foothold evidence, the
next issue is whether the employer presented substantial evidence to the contrary. If the employer did not, the decision
for the claimant must be affirmed.
(c) If the employer presented substantial evidence to
the contrary, the reviewing court must determine whether
the claimant presented substantial evidence to support the
award, because the claimant's foothold evidence may not be
enough to support the award once the presumption drops
out. If substantial evidence supports the judgment for the
claimant, the decision in favor of the claimant must be affirmed. If not, then the decision must be reversed.
3. If the record reveals that the Board's decision in
favor of the claimant was improperly influenced by the presumption, the case must be remanded for reconsideration.
In cases in which the employer has presented substantial evidence to rebut the presumption, the presumption drops out.
80. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Alaska 1978).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1046.
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The decision must be based upon the Board's independent
evaluation of all the evidence, with no influence from the
presumption.

IV.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE SCOPE OF REVIEW IN ALASKA

It is relatively simple to outline the mechanical aspects of appellate review that establish a framework for evaluating the actions of the
Board. The more difficult questions concern the court's role in evaluating the evidence presented to the Board. As suggested in the introduction, if the Board is to be effective at resolving disputed claims,
parties to disputes must be confident that the Board's decisions usually
will be affirmed on appeal. Tension is most likely to develop between
the Board and the appellate court from two types of reversals concerning the evaluation of evidence: 1) when the court reverses a Board
determination that the claimant has not presented enough evidence to
support the initial claim of work-connection; and 2) when the court
reverses a Board determination that the employer has presented substantial evidence to rebut the presumption.
The Alaska Supreme Court has been less than supportive of the
Workers' Compensation Board's evaluation of evidence and testimony, at least in those cases in which the Board has ruled against a
claimant. Nevertheless, the court's direct pronouncements on this issue appear supportive of the Board. For example, the court's decision
in Beauchamp v. Employers LiabilityAssurance Corp.83 appears to provide substantial support for the Board's authority. The court stated
that "Board members were free to rely upon their own experience,
observation and judgment in connection with all the evidence before
them."' 84 This position was reiterated in Wilson v. Erickson,8 5 in
which the court stated that the Board was not limited to the face value
of medical testimony but could rely on inferences as well as the peculiar facts of the case. 86 This language was used to reverse a denial of
benefits for permanent total disability, even though the disability appeared to be caused in part by lack of rehabilitative effort. 87
The scope of the Board's authority was also mentioned in Brown
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.88 In Brown, the employer contended that
the Board was free to disregard medical testimony, disbelieve the
claimant, and deny benefits. The court ruled neither on the extent of
83. 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970).
84. Id. at 996.
85. 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).
86. Id. at 1001. The court referred to "the court," but undoubtedly meant "the
Board."
87. Id. at 1001 n.10.
88. 444 P.2d 529 (Alaska 1968).
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such authority nor on its potential impact on the operation of the presumption. Instead, the court adopted the rationale from Ennis v.
O'Hearne,89 which held that under the proper circumstances, the factfinder may disregard medical evidence and rely upon its own observations as well as "other evidence"; in the absence of other evidence in
the record, however, a decision contrary to the medical evidence could
not stand. 90
These cases give the impression that the Board has a significant
degree of latitude in its fact-finding authority. Nonetheless, the court's
actions present a different picture. In fact, the Alaska Supreme Court
has come very close to crossing, and perhaps has crossed, the line between appellate review of Board decisions and independent re-evaluation of evidence including the credibility of witnesses.
Rogers Electric Co. v. Kouba9 ' provides some idea of how little
latitude the court intends to give the Board. Kouba was an electrician
who suffered a back injury while working at Prudhoe Bay in September 1975. He moved to Texas and received workers' compensation
until November 1975. At that time, his doctor decided he could return to work because the problem had subsided. Kouba returned to
work on an irregular basis but claimed his ability to work was diminished by the back injury, which was reaggravated by work.92 Kouba's
claim before the Board was for compensation allegedly due since November 1975 because of his reduced work ability. There were two
grounds for the Board's denial of benefits. First, the Board found that
the claimant's continuing problems were not the result of his admittedly compensable injury.93 Second, the Board found that the claimant had not missed employment opportunities as a result of his
disabilities. 94 The Board's decision rested on its finding that objective
signs of disability were absent and its view that it is unusual for disa95
bility without objective signs to last for over a year.
The supreme court summarily dismissed the Board's statement
that it is unusual for a disability to last a year without objective signs
of disability, because no evidence had been set forth in support of the
statement. Without mentioning the right of Board members, under
Beauchamp,96 to rely upon their own experience, observation, and
judgment, the court found a lack of supportive testimony in the record. The employer's expert testified that there were no objective signs
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

223 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 758.
603 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 910-11.
Id. at 911.

94. Id. at 912.
95. Id. at 911.

96. 477 P.2d 933, discussed supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
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of anything that would have prevented the claimant from working as
an electrician. On appeal, the court held that this expert's testimony
did not contradict the testimony by the claimant's expert that the pain
was work-related. 97 Stating that "any doubt as to the substance of the
medical testimony should be resolved in favor of the claimant," the
court held that "the Board's decision was not supported by the 'substantial evidence' necessary to rebut the statutory presumption of
coverage. "98
A similar attitude toward the Board is demonstrated by Alaska
Pacific Assurance Co. v. Turner.99 Turner involved a disagreement between the Board and the reviewing court on whether there was sufficient foothold evidence introduced to support the presumption of
compensability. The claimant's problems apparently began while he
was working, but he continued to work for six months. Although he
had applied for reduction-in-force layoff because of his pain, the claimant explained that "for some strange reason" he did not see a doctor
until after he suffered sharp pain while lifting the tongue of a boat
trailer at home two months after stopping work.'0 The only medical
testimony, that of the treating physician, indicated that the claimant
was first injured in the course of his employment and that the trailer
incident aggravated it, resulting in the need for surgery. 101 The Board
found that the injury was entirely due to the trailer lifting, and therefore, the injury was not compensable because it was not work-related. 10 2 In reaching its decision to require an award of benefits, the
supreme court apparently simply disagreed with the Board's evaluation of witnesses and testimony. The court held that the presumption
applied and that the injury was compensable.10 3 Once again the
Board's exercise of its experience, observation, and judgment in evaluating the evidence was reversed by the court.
The court's apparent unwillingness to permit the Board any significant latitude in rejecting testimony that might be supportive of a
claim was demonstrated even more emphatically in Kessick v. Alyeska
PipelineService Co. 104 In Kessick the court recognized that the Board
could disbelieve a portion of the claimant's testimony and that "[i]t is
well-settled that where a claimant testifies falsely in one instance the
97. 603 P.2d at 912.
98. Id.
99. 611 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).
100. Id. at 13.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id. at 15. The court relied upon Beauchamp, 477 P.2d 933, discussed supra
text accompanying notes 83-87, and Cook 476 P.2d 29,discussed supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
104. 617 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1980).
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trier of fact may elect to disregard his otherwise uncontradicted testimony."'' 0 5 Nevertheless, although there was virtually no objective evidence of continuing disability, and the Board distrusted the medical
testimony because most of it was based upon the claimant's history,
the supreme court reversed the denial of benefits because no contradictory medical evidence was presented. 0 6 As the dissent pointed out:
"The medical analysis here depended almost entirely on evaluating the
history furnished by Kessick and his subjective complaints. This is the
type of evidence
in which a compensation board has considerable
0 7
experience."'1
The supreme court's apparent refusal to allow the Board any discretion if the result is the denial of a claim reached its zenith in Black
v. Universal Services, Inc.' 08 The facts of the claim were extremely
complex. There were numerous conflicting opinions about causation,
psychological considerations, and the refusal of the initial treating
physician to re-examine the claimant because the physician believed
the claimant had been malingering. The Board based its decision at
least in part on the report of the only psychiatrist who examined the
claimant. The psychiatrist stated that the claimant's problems were
not due to the accident at work. The court's opinion reveals its view
of the Board's authority:
After reviewing the record, we are unable to accept Dr. Pennell's
report as "substantial evidence" in support of the Board's conclusion that Black's then-present disability was unrelated to the February 14, 1976, incident.
Because Dr. Pennell had no opportunity to examine Black in
any depth, and because his conclusions are contrary to those of the
numerous physicians who treated her, we have concluded that a
"reasonable mind" would not accept his diagnosis. While the judiciary may not reweigh the evidence before the Board,. . . neither
may it abdicate its reviewing function and affirm a Board decision
that has only extremely slight supporting evidence ....
We recognize that Dr. Pennell is a psychiatrist and that Drs.
Welke, Butler, Lindig, Klemperer, and Mead are not, and hence
that Pennell's conclusion that Black's problems are mental might be
given more weight than the other doctors' conclusions to the
contrary.
Dr. Pennell's report is neither doubtful nor ambiguous. However, because of the weaknesses in Pennell's report described above,
we conclude that a reasonable mind would not accept his psychological conclusions as adequate to support the Board's denial of
105. Id. at 757 n.4.
106. Id. at 758.

107. Id. at 759 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
108. 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981).
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compensation. Thus, Pennell's report does not10provide
a substantial
9
basis for the Board's denial of Black's claim.
In reaching this decision, the court decided in effect that it had
the authority and the medical expertise to determine the amount of
time a doctor must spend with a patient before his opinion becomes
"substantial." In addition, the court appears to have concluded that
Dr. Pennell and the members of the Board who concurred in the decision, as well as the superior court which affirmed it, had something
less than reasonable minds. This point was made in the dissent in
Fireman'sFund American Insurance Companies v. Gomez, in which
Justice Erwin stated that, "while I have never been able to explain a
finding by an appellate court stating that reasonable minds cannot differ on a particular question when
a reasonable judge dissents as to that
110
view, such is the case herein."'
Hoth v. Valley Construction"' is another case demonstrating the
supreme court's restrictive view of the Board's discretion. In Hoth,
the claimant had fallen from a scaffold in 1971. He had been bruised
and shaken, but was not disabled. He did not visit a doctor and returned to work the same day. He apparently experienced increasingly
serious wrist pain over the years, but did not see a doctor until
1978.112 In 1980 when the pain became disabling, his wife reminded
him of the 1971 incident, and on the basis of this history the treating
physician found a work-connection." 3 Although the Board found a
number of reasons for discounting testimony concerning injury to the
wrist in the 1971 accident, the supreme court held that compensation
should not be denied in the absence of evidence that there had been
some intervening accident."14
In addition, the Hoth court touched upon the Board's right to
determine credibility under section 122 of the Workers' Compensation
Act, which was added in 1982:
Credibility of Witnesses. The board has the sole power to determine the credibility of a witness. A finding by the board concerning
the weight to be accorded a witness's testimony, including medical
testimony and reports, is conclusive even if the evidence is conflicting or susceptible to contrary conclusions. The findings of the
board are subject to the same standard of review as a jury's finding
in a civil action." 5
The Hoth court declined to "assume" that lack of credibility was a
109. Id. at 1075-76 (footnotes and citation omitted).
110. 544 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Alaska 1976) (Erwin, J., dissenting).
111. 671 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1983).
112. Id. at 872.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 873-74.
115. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.122 (1984).
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factor in the Board's decision, because the Board had not made specific findings that it disbelieved any of the witnesses.
The supreme court had another chance to consider the credibility
issue in Land & Marine Rental Co. v. Rawls. 116 The Board denied
benefits because it believed, among other things, that the testifying
physician's opinion was based on untrustworthy information provided
by the claimant. 117 In addition, the Board found that the other doctors' medical reports eliminated all reasonable possibilities that the
118
claimant's condition was related to an earlier work-related injury.
The court never mentioned section 122, but again found that there was
no substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of
compensability. 119
The supreme court's attitude toward the Board is of considerable
importance because of the unique nature of the Board's membership.
Alaska utilizes fact-finding tribunals which consist of one "professional," usually a full-time hearing officer representing the Commissioner of Labor, and one representative each from the employee and
employer communities. 120 The latter two members are not full-time
hearing officers; they are appointed by the Governor to serve on a
part-time basis, 12 1 fulfilling their hearing responsibilities while retaining their usual occupations. For the most part, the employer and employee representatives develop workers' compensation expertise only
after appointment, as they begin to deal with cases before the Board.
One of the reasons for using lay personnel is probably to bring nontechnical expertise and experience into the hearing process to use what
is often referred to as the "common-sense" approach to resolving controversies. While this approach obviously must be constrained by
rules of due process and workers' compensation law, the Board must
have substantial latitude in exercising its responsibilities in order to
fulfill its role and respond to legislative intent. The Board's decisions,
however, are subject to a substantial amount of second-guessing during the appellate process, at least when they result in a denial of the
benefits sought by a claimant.
The enactment of section 122 seems to be a response to the
court's tight control over the Board's findings of fact. The message in
section 122 is clear; the court should not ask more of the Board than it
does of a jury when it reviews a civil jury verdict.' 2 2 Although the
116. 686 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1984).
117. Id. at 1189-90.

118. Id. at 1190.
119. Id. at 1191.
120. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.005(a) (1984).
121. Id. § 23.30.005(b).
122. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.122 (1984), quoted supra text accompanying note 115.
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court in Brown 123 refused to adopt the evidentiary rule pertaining to
jury findings in criminal trials established in Bowker v. State, 124 the
reasoning of the Bowker court is instructive of the large measure of
discretion to be afforded a civil jury finding of fact:
We shall not adopt a rule which would treat medical testimony as
conclusive merely because it is not disputed by other medical testimony. The jury should be free to make an independent analysis of
the facts on which the expert's opinion rests, and thus exercise their
historic function of passing on the credibility of the witness. If we
were to follow Douglas and accede to defendant's argument that the
jury was not competent to pass on her mental condition because of
Dr. Cheatham's testimony, we would be transferring the jury's
function to the
psychiatrist and substituting a trial by experts for a
125
trial by jury.
It may be argued that, unlike a jury, the Board is constrained by the
statutory language of the presumption, but this is to say no more than
that a jury is constrained by the trial judge's instructions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Alaska already has ample sound precedent for the two key issues
in the application of the general presumption of compensability. The
fooothold issue was addressed in Smallwood 11,126 and the dropout
issue was addressed in Gonzales.127 Although the Alaska Supreme
Court did not arrive at these decisions by adopting New York precedent, the end result is the same. Significantly, language in several
other Alaska opinions is not entirely consistent with the Smallwood 11
and Gonzales approach and might be harmful should the language
come to predominate. The principal purpose of the review of New
York precedent is to reassure the Alaska Supreme Court that it correctly decided both Smallwood II on the foothold issue and Gonzales
on the drop-out issue. For good measure, the negative example of Hawaii is presented to show how wrong things can go when a court ignores relevant precedent in interpreting an adopted presumption
clause.
The Alaska Supreme Court has not yet provided the quality of
direction and support found in Smallwood 11 and Gonzales on the issue
of the Board's fact-finding authority. The court has given some liti123. Brown v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 444 P.2d 529 (Alaska 1968), discussed
supra text accompanying note 88.
124. 373 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1962).
125. Id. at 501-02.
126. Burgess Construction Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981), discussed supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
127. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 11-14.

19851

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

gants reason to believe that the Board is merely the first step in the
fact-finding process. Unless the legislature intended the presumption
of compensability to create a policy of granting claims whenever possible, both the presumption and the Board's statutory role can be satisfied in the hearing process, as enhanced by section 122, by permitting
the Board greater latitude in its decisions. The court should reverse
only when the Board fails to apply the proper rule of substantive law
or reaches a factual conclusion that is clearly erroneous. For the
supreme court, this may be more a question of changing attitude than
128
of changing substance.
In the final analysis, the supreme court has virtually total control
over the scope of its review. Despite statutory language, the court determines whether legislative intent has been fulfilled in a given case
and whether a litigant has been treated in a constitutional manner by
the system. Nevertheless, the supreme court has limited the Board's
discretion considerably. If the court will not allow the Board to use its
inherent strengths, as a jury is permitted to do, important questions
will be raised about the system's ability to distribute benefits appropriately, and the value of a part-time lay board in the hearing process
may be lost.

128. A recent Alaska Supreme Court decision, Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, No.
2903 (Jan. 25, 1985), indicates that the court may give more deferrence to Board
decisions in the future.

